Four German Eurofighters landed at Lielvārde for about a week

Issue of 25 September 2026 — covering 24 – 25 September 2026.

Note: On Thursday four German Eurofighters landed at Lielvārde for about a week, ahead of Latvia's parliamentary election. That evening Poland sent another RCB alert to Lublin and Subcarpathian provinces and lifted it on Friday morning with the line that there is no threat on Polish territory. Danish military intelligence called the risk of a limited strike on a NATO country bordering Russia low but growing, and a full-scale invasion highly unlikely. No new violations of Lithuanian, Latvian or Estonian airspace were found in the window. (Previous issue: 24 September 2026, risk 5.1/10.)

By area, in detail

Construction of military sites and fortifications

No new kilometres of ditches, dragon's teeth, Baltic Defence Line sections or Tarcza Wschód dated 24–25 September were found in national outlets. The last published Latvian frame (7,500 of 13,000 blocks) is not repeated here as a fresh fact.
The Wola Króbowska fire damaged an existing communications station. It is not fortification work (item 4).

Troop deployments and movements

Latvia — Germany: four Eurofighters at Lielvārde from Thursday, for about a week (item 1). This is the late-September announcement being carried out, not a contingent beyond what was declared.
Lithuania and Estonia — the United States: no Pentagon release with a unit, a headcount and a date was found for 24–25 September. The English BNS retelling on LRT of 24.09, 10:02, still attributes "about a thousand" and Abrams tanks to words Kaunas spoke on Wednesday; the LRT television wording of 23.09 did not contain those details. The discrepancy is not closed.
Poland — Czarny Obrońca '26: the announced window of 14–24 September expired on Thursday. No fresh report of a close-out or a new headcount was found for 24–25 September. The figure of 11,000 troops and 880 pieces of equipment remains a single-source report from 22.09 and is not strengthened here.
Latvia — Namejs 2026 continues until 8 October; Lithuania — Perkūno griausmas 2026 until 15 October. No new dated episodes of these exercises were found for 24–25 September. No new named exercise with dates and scale, beyond the existing cards, appeared in the window: no exercise page is opened.
Estonia — scheduled NATO flights by Turkish F-16s and Spanish F/A-18s through 27 September remain in force under the 21 September notice. There is no new incident to attach them to.

Agreements and spending

The Danish assessment is an intelligence paper, not a treaty and not a NATO decision (item 3).
The Baltic ministers' request for €500 million from the European Commission: no new text of the letter, no Commission reply and no new figure were found for 24–25 September. The dispute over who signed for Estonia is not closed. The sum still traces to one newsroom.
A permanent US base in Lithuania: no new decision in the window.

Military aid and air defence / electronic warfare

Poland, air: the evening alert and the morning all-clear (item 2). The morning episode of 24 September, which yesterday's issue held on a single source, is now also in Radio ESKA Lublin: an SMS shortly before 06:00 on 24 September with the same wording about Polish aviation, citing an @RCB_RP post of 24 September. That lifts yesterday's "one source" caveat for the morning, without changing the substance: the all-clear spoke of no threat on Polish territory.
Latvia, air: four German fighters on the base (item 1).
Starlink / Exatel: an open investigation, sabotage not proved, communications not critically cut (item 4).
No new intercepts or airport restrictions over the Baltic states were found for 24–25 September.

Kaliningrad and Russia's border regions

The night of 25 September: the Interfax items found do not name the north-west (item 5). No new dated Baltic Fleet release on Kaliningrad oblast for 24–25 September was found, beyond yesterday's Supercam flights and the gunnery of Viktor Veliky, which rested on one source.
Belarus: no report dated 24–25 September in non-registry sources on the end or the continuation of the Western Operational Command command-staff exercise was found. No fresh independent report of a new exercise on the Polish and Lithuanian borders. Zapad-2026 is not being held; Ussisõnad-2026 is not independently confirmed.
The FSB border regime opposite Estonia, previously described as running until 26 September, received no new clarification in the window.

Statements by officials

Latvia — Ministry of Defence (24.09): four German Eurofighters at Lielvārde, a short stay, a test of receiving allied aircraft.
Poland — RCB (evening of 24.09 and morning of 25.09): Polish aviation is operating; then "there is no threat on the territory of Poland".
Poland — K. Gawkowski (24.09): the fire at the Starlink station, "everything points" to sabotage and hybrid war; the station is working. Prosecutors do not assert sabotage. They do not rule it out.
Denmark — T. Ahrenkiel and the DDIS text (24.09): a low but growing risk of a limited strike on a NATO country on the Russian border in the coming months; an invasion is highly unlikely and is not ruled out; the service does not expect a strike on Denmark.
NATO — Johnny Stringer, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Postimees published the interview on 24 September (updated 17:53). The conversation itself, according to the paper, took place on Tuesday 22 September during Estonian Defence Week. This is one source, and the words were spoken before the window. Stringer: NATO "would never attack first"; "sometimes to defend, you have to attack", and if, "God forbid, we should ever find ourselves in a military conflict", targets would have to be struck to protect citizens, "that is what we would do". He declined to give timelines for a possible Russian strike. Of a large attack he said it would produce indicators and warnings; smaller operations can be assembled faster. On drones: the air-defence approach has been developed over the past year, "you will see a new approach", with no details. The interview is not treated as a fresh decision of this window.
Russia: no Kremlin or foreign-ministry statement dated 24–25 September on the Danish assessment, the German fighters or the Starlink fire was found in non-registry sources. BBC notes that the Kremlin has not commented on the fire.

⚠️ Contradictions and discrepancies

The morning of 24 September no longer rests on one source. Yesterday's issue left the scramble and the RCB alert around 05:45 on Radio Lublin/PAP and did not move the score until another outlet repeated the episode. Radio ESKA Lublin describes the same SMS shortly before 06:00 on 24 September and an RCB post. The substance is unchanged: the all-clear did not state a threat on Polish territory. There is no error in yesterday's issue: the caveat was right at the time of that build. It does not require an entry in corrections.json.
The evening of 24 September and "90 km". The alert text, the two provinces and the morning all-clear agree across Radio Lublin, Do Rzeczy and Radio ESKA Rzeszów. The distance "about 90 km" and the explosions in Lutsk are in Onet via Straznik.eu and a local councillor. That distance is not in the headline and not in the score.
Starlink sabotage. Gawkowski speaks as if sabotage is already visible. The prosecutor says "we do not rule it out". BBC keeps a short-circuit version beside it. Onet's unofficial liquid is not confirmed by the investigation. Russian authorship is not established. The sources do not name casualties or a critical loss of communications.
The Danish assessment and the headlines. "A strike in the coming months" is easy to read, in some retellings, as a forecast of a date. In the DDIS text it is a low risk of a limited strike, and a full-scale invasion is highly unlikely and not ruled out. The service calls a force buildup for even a small insertion visible and not quick. Both limits are in the item, not only "the coming months".
The Stringer interview. Published on 24 September, the conversation on 22 September, one newsroom. The conditional sentence about striking targets is not an order and not a change of rules of engagement in this window.
The size of the US rotation in Lithuania. The BNS retelling of 24.09 still gives "about a thousand" and Abrams. The LRT television interview of 23.09 did not record that. No new document chooses one version.
Russia's north-west. Four Interfax items of 25 September do not name the north-west. There is no Defence Ministry summary with a list of regions. Absence from the items selected is not a claim that a region was absent from a full list.
Belarus and phantom exercises. No fresh non-registry report for 24–25 September of a command-staff exercise at the Suwałki Gap. Zapad-2026 has not been announced. Ussisõnad-2026 is not independently confirmed.
No new substantive errors in previous issues requiring an entry in corrections.json were found. The missed scramble of 21 September was logged on 22 September; the score for the 21st is not recalculated retroactively.

📊 Escalation risk assessment (0–10): 5.1 / 10

Score: 5.1 / 10. Unchanged from the issue of 24 September. The nearest historical analogue is a tense late-Cold-War confrontation (≈3–4), with a premium for the drone shootdown over Lithuania on 15 September, for the war a few kilometres from the Polish border, and for the nuclear item that remains on the Lithuanian calendar (the next vote is 6 October). Noticeably below Able Archer 1983 (≈7) and the run-up to 2008/2014 (≈6–7): no casualties on NATO territory in the window, no new shot against the alliance, and the airspace of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia was not violated.

Drivers on the Russian side and its ally:

Strikes on Ukraine near the Polish border. The evening of 24 September was another RCB alert and a text about Polish aviation in the air; the morning of the 25th was an all-clear with no violation stated. The morning episode of the 24th is now confirmed by a second outlet. The run of preventive scrambles has not broken.
The DDIS assessment. A low but growing risk of a limited strike on a NATO country on the Russian border in the coming months. These are intelligence words about intent, not an observed movement.
The fire at a station that carries Starlink for the Ukrainian army. Authorship is not established. It enters as an open hybrid version, not as a proven strike.
Overnight strikes on Russia on 25 September run through the centre and the south in the items found. The north-west is not in them, and there is no full Defence Ministry list.
Belarus: no fresh dated event at the Suwałki Gap in the window. The unclosed status of the command-staff exercise after 18 September did not itself become a new fact.

Drivers on the NATO side and individual members:

Four German fighters at Lielvārde. For Moscow this is combat aviation on Latvian soil. In Riga's statement it is a short, previously requested reinforcement for the 3 October election and a reception test, not a new brigade.
Polish aviation in the air according to the RCB text on the night of 25 September. The all-clear is worded as no threat on Polish territory.
Stringer's rhetoric (conversation 22.09, publication 24.09, one source): a conditional readiness to strike targets if a conflict has already begun, and a refusal to name timelines. This is not a new rule of engagement.
Continuing exercises Namejs and Perkūno griausmas, with no fresh episode. The Czarny Obrońca '26 window expired without a new close-out report.

Mutual / structural factors:

The Russia–Ukraine war as the source of the Polish alerts and as the background of the Danish assessment.
The hybrid contour: an open case about a communications station in Masovia, with two working versions (sabotage and a short circuit).
The calendar: Latvia's Saeima election on 3 October, Lithuania's constitutional procedure on 6 October. The German fighters are tied to the first of those dates.

Stabilisers (both sides):

The all-clear in Poland on the morning of 25 September, several independent relays of one RCB text: no threat on Polish territory. The "90 km" distance is not established.
The Danish paper cuts the risk both ways. A limited strike is called low and desperate. An invasion is called highly unlikely. The service treats a buildup for an insertion as visible and not quick. Ahrenkiel does not expect a strike on Denmark.
The German fighters are the announced defensive package, about a week, not a concealed reinforcement.
Starlink, according to Gawkowski, remains in operation; there is no critical loss of communications. The investigation has not named a perpetrator.
No new air alerts in the Baltic states.
The north-west does not appear in the Interfax items found for 25 September. This is not a ministry summary of quiet.
No Kremlin reaction to the Danish assessment, the fighters or the fire was found in non-registry sources in the window.
Lithuania's nuclear vote did not advance in these 24 hours.

Why this score: holding 5.1 follows from the new facts refining a class of events already counted, and not adding another. Yesterday's score already included the run of Polish scrambles and the return of US rotations at the previous scale. Today the run gained another night and a second outlet for the morning of the 24th, but the all-clear again does not report a violation. The four Eurofighters are the arrival of aircraft already announced, not an extra contingent. The Danish text raises the verbal risk and immediately bounds it: low, visible in advance, an invasion highly unlikely. The fire near Warsaw is being investigated as possible sabotage and as a possible accident; a Russian attack does not follow from it. There is no reason to lower the score: the alert series has not broken, the war at the border continues, and the calendar of 3 and 6 October has not been taken off.

Delta from the previous issue: = (0.0) — 5.1 (24 September) → 5.1 (25 September). Reason: a Polish night alert of the same preventive type, fighters that had already been requested, and an intelligence assessment with an explicit low-probability caveat do not change the scale of forces and do not add an incident on NATO territory.

Caveat: this is an analytical assessment from open sources, not a forecast.

Top stories of the day

By area, in detail

Construction of military sites and fortifications

Troop deployments and movements

Agreements and spending

Military aid and air defence / electronic warfare

Kaliningrad and Russia's border regions

Statements by officials

⚠️ Contradictions and discrepancies

📊 Escalation risk assessment (0–10): 5.1 / 10

Sources

Four German Eurofighters landed at Lielvārde for about a week

Top stories of the day

Get every issue in Telegram

By area, in detail

Construction of military sites and fortifications

Troop deployments and movements

Agreements and spending

Military aid and air defence / electronic warfare

Kaliningrad and Russia's border regions

Statements by officials

⚠️ Contradictions and discrepancies

📊 Escalation risk assessment (0–10): 5.1 / 10

Sources