Corrections

The 17 October issue (window 16–17 October) omitted Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk's remarks to journalists in Brussels after the EU summit on 16 October: "można spodziewać się jakiejś eskalacji jeszcze przed Wigilią" ("some escalation can be expected even before Christmas Eve"), winter will be very hard for borders and railways, and sabotage attempts and provocations will come "na większą skalę" ("on a larger scale"). The remarks were published on 16 October (Polsat News), before the issue was built; confirmed by Defence24 (17.10.2026) and Interia. The omission is made good in the 18 October issue. The 5.2 score for 17 October is not recalculated: the remarks concern hybrid threats, not military action.

The 15 October issue (window 14–15 October) had two omissions. 1) It said no full named list of the Russian defence ministry for the night into 15 October was available from allowed outlets at build time. That was incomplete: Interfax published the list (166 drones over 14 regions) on 15.10.2026 at 09:01 Moscow time (06:01 UTC), before the issue was committed at 06:10 UTC. Leningrad, Pskov and Kaliningrad oblasts and St Petersburg are not on it. 2) The issue omitted Estonian defence minister Martin Herem's remark (ERR News, 14.10.2026, 15:56) that Estonia should consider light fighter jets, including arming L-39 trainers, against Russian jet-powered drones; no decision, type or budget was named. The 5.1 score for 15 October is not recalculated: neither omission adds a border violation or a strike on the northwest.

The 14 October issue (window 13–14 October) omitted three events published before the build. 1) The arrival of the first troops of the returning US rotation in Lithuania: President Gitanas Nausėda's post and LRT and 15min reports came out on the evening of 13 October; per Defence Minister Robertas Kaunas, about 100 troops arrived out of two battalions (more than 1,000 by mid-November). 2) The Russian MoD overnight list for 14 October (902 UAVs): the issue said no second permitted outlet had a full list of regions, but Interfax (14.10, 05:52 UTC) gave the full list — Leningrad, Pskov and Kaliningrad regions and St Petersburg are absent, Novgorod region is named. 3) The debris found on the beach at Karwia (Poland) on 13 October at about 18:30 (Polsat News); on 14 October Poland's defence minister identified it as a Polish drone destroyed during trials at Ustka. The 5.1 score for 14 October is not recalculated: none of these events adds a border violation or a strike on the northwest.

The 13 October issue (the opening note and the section on the defence ministry lists) stated that a full overnight list with oblasts had not been found at compilation. That was already incomplete at the morning compilation: Interfax, with the figure 604 and the full list of oblasts, carries a publication stamp of 13.10.2026, 05:59 UTC, which is before the scheduled start of compilation at 06:00 UTC. The list names Bryansk, Belgorod, Oryol, Kaluga, Tula, Kursk, Voronezh, Tver, Lipetsk, Ryazan, Rostov and Smolensk oblasts, the Moscow region, Stavropol and Krasnodar krais and the Sea of Azov. Leningrad oblast, Pskov, Kaliningrad and St Petersburg are not on the list. The 5.1 score for 13 October is not recalculated: the list that was missing is precisely one that does not name the Baltic northwest, and the reading already rested on the northwest not being named where oblasts are listed.

The 13 October issue omits General Alexus Grynkewich's speech at the Warsaw Security Forum on 12 October, although that issue's window included 12 October and the Polish defence ministry page and the Defence24 item appeared during the day of 12 October, before the morning compilation of 13 October. The ministry quotes the Supreme Allied Commander Europe: if the alliance is attacked, it will fight; "if we are attacked, we are ready to fight tonight"; a threat of escalation will not fracture the alliance. A transcript (americanrhetoric.com, delivered 12 October 2026) puts the three steps this way: block the initial attack; if the attack continues, blunt it and prevent an advance; if required, break the adversary's forces and the system that sustains them. Defence24 (12.10) puts the verbs differently: first blunt the initial attack, then block the continuation, then degrade the adversary. The order in the Defence24 retelling does not match the transcript; this digest keeps the transcript's order. This is a defensive doctrine at a conference, not a named movement of troops and not an incident. The 5.1 score for 13 October is not recalculated.

The 11 October issue (window 10–11 October) stated that no new NATO response to the earlier Kaliningrad note had been found. That is incomplete: the Italian original of Military Committee chair Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone's interview in Repubblica is dated 10 October 2026 (publication around 01:00), and Italpress the same day carries that the eastern flank is "serious, but under control", that "NATO is not preparing any blockade of Kaliningrad", that this is a threat built on a scenario that does not exist, and that the Theory of Victory was still to be set out by Grynkewich in Warsaw on 12 October. The English Repubblica page stamped 14 October 2026, 06:00, contains the same points, but in one place puts the Warsaw presentation in the past tense and in another speaks of a forthcoming presentation. This is not a new interview of 14 October. The past tense in the English text does not confirm a separate statement after 12 October. The 5.1 score for 11 October is not recalculated: the statement denies that a blockade is being prepared and names no movement of troops.

The 10 October issue (the opening note, the air-defence section and the stabilisers) stated that no new scramble and no new RCB alert dated 9 or 10 October, apart from the evening episodes of 8 October, had been found. That was already incomplete at the morning compilation: around midnight on 10 October the RCB sent an alert to Lublin and Podkarpackie voivodeships ("Polish aircraft are operating in Polish airspace"), and before 07:00 cancelled it with "there is no threat on Polish territory" (Polsat News, updated 07:00; lublin112, 07:58; the gov.pl page of 10.10). The issue cites the morning Fontanka of 07:51, so those pages already fell inside the reading window. There is no separate Operational Command sentence "no violation was observed" for that night: Polsat's headline about fighters being scrambled is wider than the body, which quotes the RCB. The evening episode around 18:30 appeared after the morning compilation and is not an error of the 10 October issue. The 5.1 score for 10 October is not recalculated: the class of event (an alert with a cancellation, and no named violation) was already holding the reading all week.

The 29 September issue (the opening note, item 4 of Top stories and the Kaliningrad section) stated that no independent text of the Russian embassy statement in Belgium had been found beyond reprints of a state agency. That is incomplete for the calendar day of 29 September: after the morning compilation, at 16:22, Der Spiegel, citing dpa, which said it had seen the letter, published wording on possible Russian strikes against decision-making centres in NATO states at the very start of a conflict and on readiness to use the entire arsenal, including nuclear weapons, if an attempt were made to isolate Kaliningrad. The same day NATO spokesperson Allison Hart confirmed that an informal document had been received and answered, and condemned the threat of force, including irresponsible nuclear rhetoric (Spiegel and Kyiv Post, 29.09). The public embassy excerpts in Kommersant/TASS and in Kyiv Post still speak of the "entire arsenal" and do not contain the words "nuclear weapons" or "decision-making centres". The 29 September score is not recalculated: the embassy's rhetoric was already part of the basis for 5.1, and no troop movement was named alongside the note.

The 28 September issue (the opening note, item 4 of Top stories, the stabilisers and the reasoning for the score) stated that no new Polish air page had been found for 27–28 September. That is incomplete for the calendar day of 28 September: after the morning compilation, in the afternoon, the Government Centre for Security sent an alert across Lublin Province, sirens sounded in the region, Operational Command scrambled aircraft, and defence minister W. Kosiniak-Kamysz said a jet drone struck on the Ukrainian side about 2 km from the Dorohusk crossing and that Polish airspace was not violated (Onet, WP, PAP, LRT, 28.09). The 28 September score is not recalculated: the issue did not lower the score because the air picture looked empty, and the class of event (a scramble without a violation) was already part of the basis for 5.1.

The 26 September issue (the note under the score and the reasoning for 5.1) said there were "no casualties on NATO territory in the window" and that the new facts "add no incident on NATO territory". That is incomplete: on Friday 25 September, in the late afternoon, four soldiers of Italy's 11th Bersaglieri Regiment were injured during NATO Forward Land Forces live fire at the Ādaži training area. Latvia's National Armed Forces (LSM, 26.09, 11:15) and the Italian Ministry of Defence (difesa.it; Il Sole 24 Ore, 25.09, updated at 21:00, i.e. before the Saturday-morning compilation of the 26 September issue) agree that nobody's life is in danger and that one soldier is in a more serious condition. It is a training accident inside a base, not a strike from outside and not a border violation. The 26 September score is not recalculated: the class of event on which 5.1 rested (no hostile casualties and no new airspace violation) does not change. The wording "non-automatic firearm" belongs to the Italian ministry; a reconstruction of a machine-gun burst from a Dardo appears in some newsrooms and is not the official text.

The 24 September issue omitted a violation of Polish airspace: on 23 September at 11:08 an Mi-8 helicopter of the Russian Armed Forces flying from Kaliningrad Oblast entered Polish airspace north of Braniewo to a depth of up to 300 m and stayed for 42 seconds; fighters were scrambled (Polish Operational Command statement, TVN24 at 13:41 and RMF24 at 13:45 on 23 September, i.e. before the issue was compiled). Because of the omission the issue said the window's new facts "add no incident" and justified the 5.1 score partly by the absence of a new violation. Correct: the 23–24 September window contained a confirmed violation of a NATO border by a crewed Russian military aircraft. The 24 September score is not recalculated retroactively. The 25 September issue covers 24–25 September and does not reflect the episode either; this correction was logged after it was published.

The 21 September issue (the opening note, item 3 of Top stories, the Stabilisers section and the reasoning behind the score) described the absence of dated Polish scrambles on 20 and 21 September as a "break in the cascade" and as the window's main stabilising fact, and on that basis the score was lowered from 5.1 to 4.9. The conclusion is wrong: on the evening of 21 September, at 21:41 RMF24 and at 21:43 WP reported a new scramble of military aviation in Polish airspace and an RCB alert sent to 24 districts of Lublin Province; operations ended shortly after 23:00 and there was no airspace violation. In fact only 20 September passed without a dated episode; the run of scrambles did not break. The reports appeared after the 21 September issue had been built. The 21 September score is not recalculated; the factor is reflected in the 22 September issue.

The issues of 18 and 19 September described the 18–20 September active phase of Estonia's Orkaan XX exercise as covering "Saare/Pärnu/Lääne/Hiiumaa". That is incorrect: per the organisers' 3 September announcement, the Saaremaa part ran 3–13 September and had already ended by the 18th to 20th, while the 10–20 September phase peaking on the 18th to 20th takes place in Pärnumaa, Läänemaa and Hiiumaa. The overall figure of about 1,500 participants is confirmed. Source: the Lääneranna Teataja announcement of 03.09.2026.

The 16, 17 and 18 September issues, in the Belarus block, stated that there were ‘no new independent reports on the course’ of the readiness check and/or that no dated Belarusian military events were identified in those windows. This is incomplete: on 15–18 September Belarus’s Western Operational Command ran a command-and-staff exercise in Brest and Grodno oblasts (the Hoża range on the Lithuanian border, Brest and Ruzhany roughly 15 and 60 km from Poland; the Suwałki Gap area). The theme was command and control while securing the border and enforcing martial law, and countering sabotage groups and UAVs; numbers per Minsk stayed below the 2011 Vienna Document notification thresholds. Correct: the 15–18 September windows did contain a dated Belarusian military event on the Polish and Lithuanian borders. Confirmation: Euronews (16.09, citing Radio Svaboda / the Belarusian MoD), Belarus24/tvr.by (18.09). Those days’ scores are not recalculated retroactively; the factor is included in the 19 September issue.

The 13 September issue (the note and item 4 of Top stories) stated that "no new violations of Baltic airspace were recorded on the calendar days of the 12–13 September window" and that the last brush against the Baltic air contour was dated 1 September. This is wrong: at 04:05–04:25 on 13 September an unidentified object ("most likely a drone" per Lithuania's National Crisis Management Centre) crossed Lithuanian airspace near Varėna on its way from Belarus to Kaliningrad Oblast, covering 60–70 km; no alert was declared and no fighters were scrambled. The NKVC/LRT, 15min, The Insider and European Pravda reports appeared on 13 September after that issue was built. The 13 September score is not recalculated; the factor is included in the 14 September issue.

The 12 September issue (window 11–12 September), in the section on Kaliningrad and Russia’s border regions, stated that ‘no separate Belarusian military events dated within the window were identified’. This is incorrect: on 11 September Alexander Lukashenko, at the Obuz-Lesnovsky range (Brest region, near Baranavichy), announced that the combat-readiness check extends to ‘the whole army, up to mobilisation’ — an artillery brigade (earlier named as the 51st, under check since 24 August) and signals units are being checked, after tank and motor-rifle units; no actual mobilisation has been declared. Correct: the 11–12 September window did contain a dated Belarusian military event relevant to the Suwałki Gap area. Confirmation: Kyiv Independent (11.09), Meduza (11.09), the official portal belarus.by (11.09). The 12 September score (4.3) is not recalculated retroactively; the 13 September issue includes the factor (delta +0.1 together with the Kaliningrad rhetorical exchange).

In the 3–4 September issues (Estonia's shell scandal) the recipient of the ~€70m advance was described as 'Indian companies'. That attribution is imprecise. On clarified reporting, the advance from the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (RKIK) went to Datasel S.R.L. — an Italy-registered company owned by India's Neco Defence Munitions; neither had a track record of delivering artillery shells. Correct: the direct payee was Italy-registered Datasel S.R.L. (Indian owner Neco Defence Munitions); Estonia is disputing the contract in arbitration in Strasbourg. Confirmed by Euronews, Estonian World, OpIndia.

The 1 September issue (window 31 August – 1 September) called the NATO–Russia line quiet, stating that 'no new Baltic airspace violations were recorded' and that 'the last drone intercept remains dated 14 August.' This is incorrect: within that same window, overnight and early on 1 September, foreign drones (probably Ukrainian, deflected amid the Russia–Ukraine war) violated the airspace of Latvia (a Ludza warning ~02:00–02:25, an orange alert over Alūksne ~03:37–04:17) and Estonia (south-east; a turn-back near Narva), forcing NATO Baltic Air Policing fighters (Turkish F-16s from Ämari) to scramble and air-threat warnings to be sent to residents of several counties (threat over by ~05:30, no damage, no weapons fired). Correct: the 31 August – 1 September window was not free of Baltic airspace incidents. Confirmation: eng.lsm.lv (01.09), news.err.ee (01.09), Stars and Stripes (01.09), Newsweek (01.09). The 2 September issue corrects the premise and re-derives the risk score to reflect a real brush against the NATO line (delta +0.2).

The 22 August issue listed Estonia's territorial-defence exercise Ussisõnad (declared active phase 28 August – 8 October, up to ~10,000 reservists) as an approaching structural driver. This is incorrect: those exact figures and dates trace only to the 2023 edition of Ussisõnad (mil.ee, ERR — 2023). No independent confirmation of a 2026 edition with those parameters was found, so the item and its source were removed from the issue. The escalation score (4.2/10) is unchanged: the exercise had entered the reasoning as both a minor defensive up-factor and a stabilizer, so its removal is self-cancelling.

Several earlier issues in this series (including 10 August) cited an 'approaching Zapad-2026 exercise' as a structural risk driver. This is incorrect: the 'Zapad' strategic exercises are held every four years (quadrennially); the last was 'Zapad-2025' (12–16 September 2025), with the next expected around 2029. No 'Zapad-2026' has been announced. The Kaliningrad activity datable to August 2026 is command-and-staff drills with the Western Military District's all-arms army on 24–28 August (per the Baltic Fleet press service/TASS), not 'Zapad-2026'. Confirmation: RFE/RL (Zapad's quadrennial cadence), Defense News (Zapad-2025 dates, September 2025). The 11 August issue removes the 'Zapad-2026' reference and re-derives the risk score without that phantom driver (reflected in the −0.1 delta).

The 3 August issue (and preceding issues in the series) stated that the north-western corner near the Baltics (Pskov/Leningrad regions, St. Petersburg) 'remains off the strike list for a seventh consecutive night cycle' and that 'the last real strike on St. Petersburg/Leningrad was on 3 June'. This is incorrect. Per independent sources, strikes on Leningrad region/St. Petersburg continued throughout: 4 July 2026 — a major strike on the Primorsk sea port and oil terminal (NBC News, The Moscow Times, Al Jazeera, Ukrainska Pravda); 24 July — fires at Wildberries warehouses near St. Petersburg (Euronews, Ukrainska Pravda); 1–2 August — strikes on St. Petersburg/Leningrad region again amid a mass attack (The Moscow Times, Daily Maverick/Reuters); 4 August — a strike on Leningrad region (Wildberries warehouse near Krasny Bor, 15–17 UAVs; Fontanka, Anadolu Agency). Correct: the NW corner near the Baltics remained kinetically active throughout July and into early August. The erroneous 'calm NW corner' claim partly justified an unwarranted lowering of the escalation-risk score; the 4 August issue corrects the premise and adjusts the score upward.

The 11 July issue dated Russian Deputy FM Mikhail Galuzin's accusation that the Baltics provide 'air corridors' for Ukrainian drones to 9 July. Per independent sources (RT, international wires, Russian business media — Kommersant, Fontanka), Galuzin's statement itself was made on 4 July 2026; 9 July refers to the Baltic reaction (Lithuania's delivery of a protest note), not to the accusation itself. The joint trilateral demarche by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia at the Russian MFA followed on 11 July.

The June 11 issue stated the Freedom Shield 26-I exercise (Pabradė, Lithuania) involved ~3,000 troops, of which ~2,900 German. Per primary sources (Bundeswehr, Tagesspiegel, t-online), the correct figures are ~2,900 troops in total, of which ~2,400 German. The '2,900 German' figure was a misattribution of the total headcount to the German contingent.

An early run of the June 3 issue stated Estonia's 2026 defence spending as 3.38% of GDP. The correct figure is 5.4% of GDP (confirmed by the Estonian MoD, Euronews, Defense Express). Corrected the same day; the discrepancy was logged in the issue's Contradictions section.